@mayjay
Prepare to be engaged and to have contemporary history's version of the motivations of Lincoln and his conduct of the early years of the Civil War significantly complexified.
You have to work some extra to put yourself in Abbott's position writing without knowledge of how the war would play out after 1862 to do justice to what he accomplished, even just in the reportorial aspects of his narrative.
But it is his remarks about certain incidences, like General Fremont's being relieved in the Missouri department, and the reasons behind it, that this book just dropped my jaw wide open.
Again, his is one version and one version only. But regarding Fremont, alone, what he claims is so crucial and so extensive in its implications, professional and amateur historians absolutely must revisit this moment in the US Civil War. I am already convinced that Lincoln's conduct of the war cannot be grasped until one understands that Lincoln had, opposing his then new political party--the Republicans--General McClellan on the Democrat's side hoping to replace Lincoln by building an alliance with the Democratic South, and on the other side of Lincoln, within the Republican Party itself, General Fremont wanting to build a staunch anti-slavery alliance (to take the young Republican party BACK to Fremont's 1856 presidential campaign position) intent on destroying the South and its feudal planter aristocracy built on chattel slavery and New York loans to build vast plantations. Without putting too fine of a point on it, Lincoln spent the first three years of the war largely having to defeat Democrat McClellan and Republican Fremont, before Lincoln could get on with defeating the South. This may be old news to some, but to me I had always viewed Lincoln as struggling only on one political flank, i.e., with Democrat McClellan.
Now, because my juices are flowing, I must inject some of my own thoughts expanding way beyond Abbott's relatively brief speculations about the possible motivations of the dismissal of Fremont, and about McClellan's often conspicuously limited macro prosecution of the war. IMHO, General Fremont may have actually conceived a detailed military strategy for military conquest of the South as far back as in the Missouri Department 1861, or also possible, the US Army may have previously conceived of this plan in the 10-20 year run up to the war, during the many times the southern states threatened the north with secession. But since prewar planning is pure speculation at this point, let me get back to Fremont. In 1861, Fremont recommended moving immediately from Missouri to take the forts on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, as was in fact done several years later by the Union. Note also that Grant was serving under Fremont in Missouri, and my hypothesis is that Grant got his big picture strategy for the war from Fremont and/or surviving staff in the coming few years. My speculation is that Fremont immediately understood that striking there, forced the South, not merely to fend off the attack, but to have to choose which way to defend the North at perhaps its weakest, most vulnerable point (note: not at the easiest, least costly point for the North to attack, but the point that would most devastate the South strategically and make it the least able to win an all out war). If the South defended the eastward path (i.e., to protect their supply lines to New Orleans, and later to Mexican ports used by the English) , Fremont would go south and take Vicksburg and the south Mississippi Basin. If they defended the Southern Mississippi, he would strike immediately farther eastward into the heart of the south. From that moment, the south would be continually in the grip of having to choose whether to stop his eastward movement, or stop his southward movement, as he progressed across the south, cutting it in two, as in fact Grant and Sherman would eventually copy. Starting so early would also have forced the South to move major forces from Virginia to stop Fremont, which would have enabled any Union general to march down the eastern seaboard with far less resistance and take over the ports and railroads of the eastern seaboard much faster, pivot and head east across Georgia and put the South in a hammer and anvil in Chattanooga, or Atlanta. If Abbott's speculations were to be verified about Fremont's astuteness and skillfulness, thus refuting the "official story" of Civil War history about Fremont being an incompetant--the version written by the winners afterwards that had cleared both Fremont and McClellan from Lincoln's wake, then it is significantly plausible that General Fremont's plan was intentionally shelved and Fremont cleared from Lincoln's wake, while Lincoln focused on finding a way to get rid of McClellan next, BEFORE getting on with defeating the South. Had Fremont not been sidelined, Fremont might well have accelerated toward victory in a way that would have: a.) enhanced a Fremont candidacy; and b.) forced McClellan to more aggressive fighting just to save his southern allies from Fremont, and so the war might have concluded by 1863! Why? Because left in charge and to his own devices, Fremont would likely have begun the operations on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers in 1861, or early 1862, instead of as it dragged on due to unnecessary retreats, and reconquests, in Missouri and strategically unnecessary engagements west of the Mississippi, such as at Pea Ridge. Offensive action penetrating into the heart of the Confederacy did not reach full steam until October of 1863, when Lincoln promoted Grant head of the Division of the Mississippi, and March 1864 when Lincoln promoted Grant to head of all Union Armies.
Why would Lincoln not have been ready to defeat the south ASAP? That is a HUGE historical question?
The answer is likely multi-factorial.
Lincoln, a deeply unpopular President from the start, and one facing so many assassination threats even just as President-elect, that he came into Washington, D.C., unannounced, had to prosecute the war in a way that kept him President, or he would not have been able to achieve either his personal objectives, or the objectives of his core base base of Great Lakes industrialists and Morgan banking interests (the Morgan's being the USA agent banker for the Rothschild's and Bank of England, which were simultaneously financing the North, the South and the Joint Great Power invasion of Mexico that would start about a year after the start of the US Civil War, when Anaconda had blocked off the Confederate ports. The British invading Mexico assured they could keep ports open their and off load supplies to be shipped north overland to the Confederacy.
Lincoln logically must have realized the Rothschild's and Morgans, and almost certainly the Crown itself, were financing the US Civil War (by financing both North and South) and planning for the imminent Great Power invasion of Mexico in order to bargain for control of both the building of the transcontinental railroads and a subsequent interocean canal across the Tehuantepec isthmus of Mexico, by destabilizing the troubled USA-Mexican relationship. In turn, Lincoln, the savvy politician, probably logically reasoned that it would be unwise to prosecute the US Civil War in a way that revitalized the Presidential hopes (and still strong popularity) of 1856 anti-slavery candidate Fremont--the anti-slavery candidate who unequivocally wanted to crush the South, and its English and French financed slave plantation economy, and use his wealth and influence in California in conjunction with the Big Four of San Francisco to control the western terminus of any transcontinental railroad and telegraph. Lincoln would also logically have been loath to have made a hero of General McClelland either. Lincoln would not have wanted to intensify the already looming 1864 Presidential hopes of the wildly popular and well connected General McClelland, the conciliatory, pro-north-south-power-sharing candidate with a political-financial base in Baltimore, Philly and with Southern rail interests, as well as specific ties to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad--the rail road and port that could strangle off export of iron, steel, grain, manufacturing, and rapidly increasingly, kerosene exports, from the north's burgeoning Great Lakes region , if someone other than a Great Lakes industrial coalition wound up with control of the B&O during and after the war. Both Fremont and McClellan were largely forced on Lincoln in the first place. Fremont was a part of the price of keeping California aligned with the North. McClellan was part of the price of trying to keep Philly, and Baltimore and the rest of Maryland on his side, when Baltimore and Maryland were likely to go Confederate, when Philly had to be appeased to keep them from fearing the Pittsburg mill owners were getting too powerful with Lincoln, and, when Robert E. Lee turned down Lincoln's offer to head the Union Armies, implying Virginia was joining the Confederates. Lincoln did not dare allow Maryland to go confederate for it would have met withdrawing from Washington and that would have opened up massive divisions in the north over where to locate the Union capital.
Lincoln also desperately needed California on the North's side, so the telegraph and then his backers' railroad could go coast to coast, and even more urgently in the short term, Lincoln needed California's gold to back purchases of munitions and other war spending.
But, at the same time Lincoln had to accept Fremont and McClelland for reasons just outlined, he had to find ways to keep them from pursuing agendas counter to his and battle plans that either enhanced them as candidates, or undermined his core base's capacities to control transcontinental rail, telegraph and iron/steel. In short, he had to accept the two generals (and many others, too), find ways to keep them from being too successful at what they wanted to do for their bases (war is economics by other means and many Generals represent private sector interests at least indirectly), and ultimately rid himself of both in order to prosecute the war successfully and come out at the end of the tunnel in control of the vast war machine that was going to be created in order to defeat the South.
It was the vastness of the war machine Lincoln was able to build and eventually gain full control over in the end that thwarted the British strategy of North American destabilization, brought them finally to partnership with the north in the closing years of the war, and apparently triggered the necessity to assassinate Lincoln at a war's end.
To be blunt, Lincoln was King of North America at war's end. He could have done what ever he wanted, and made it stick militarily, and financially, at war's end. Why financially? Because once rock oil and kerosene exports skyrocketed from Lincoln repurposing the whaling fleet to blockading the Southern camphene from being exported, thus driving up the price and demand for kerosene, annual kerosene exports quickly reached around $400,000,000 during 1862, alone. Further, Lincoln had both California's gold, and the Rockefeller Cleveland rock oil refiners associations oil exports to use to back his new green back currency that freed him from needing to borrow entirely at the mercy of the Rothschild's and Morgans, and so there was nothing the Crown, or the Rothschild's, or the Morgans, could do about Lincoln and his New World, American military colossus that everyone from Karl Marx, to Great Power generals had come to study, publicly scoff at, and and secretly worry like hell about. Lincoln also had a sizable Navy and could easily build one equivalent to the Crown of Great Britains in a year, or two at the outside. And he had too big of an Army for the Crown to invade and stop the building of the Navy. And by having taken Baltimore and Maryland, he had gained control of the B&O, so he had indirect control of all of the coal, iron, steel, and kerosene, that needed the B&O to distribute it. That meant that his own oligarchy could not necessarily make him heel. Further, by having authorized the hurried building of the transcontinental telegraph during 1862-63, and being in control of California (Fremont marginalized and broken financially and the Big Four made allies), especially San Francisco Bay, Lincoln had monopoly control of high speed, transcontinental communication, so he could easily out maneuver the Crown of Great Britain, or any other Great Power of Europe, at either end of the continent. Note also that Lincoln was so ambitious and far sighted that he further authorized the building of an overland telegraph from San Francisco to Russian America (shortly purchased as Seward's Folly called Alaska), thence across the Bering Strait, and across Asia to Moscow. This enterprise collapsed well before completion after Lincoln's assassination and with Great Britain finally succeeding in laying a transatlantic cable to North America. Imagine if Lincoln's telegraph linking New York to Moscow had been completed. Imagine an American empire stretching New York to Moscow. But I digress.
Finally, Lincoln's combination of a vast land army, near absolute logistical/communication advantage, and a strong navy that could have been easily expanded into the largest Navy in the world, would have made it child's play to go down and pick off Cuba and Puerto Rico, and eventually St. Kitts (what the British Admiralty called the Gibraltar of the Caribbean), and deny the Caribbean to the Great Powers of Europe, and build a central American canal within a few more years, obsoleting British trade routes around the southern tip of South America, and maybe even the nearly new Suez Canal passage. And Lincoln would have controlled via pure monopoly things like sugar, rum, grain shipping, and all the sea lanes related to such through the western hemisphere. Lincoln would have been in sole control of a toll booth in the Western hemisphere that he could have set any price on for tolls. Plus he would have controlled the world's center for Naval Stores production in North Carolina.
Plus he had been suggesting since well before and during the war, that it would be better in the long run if African Americans were sent back to Africa, rather than have America make what he thought would be a difficult, if not impossible attempt at living together. An ugly idea for sure. But what if too many persons have focused too much on the racist dimension of Lincoln's attitudes (there seems little doubt he was a racist, despite moderating it with his constitutional principles), and not enough on his remarkable ambitions for constitutional, representative government. The epic scale of his plan to join New York and Moscow by telegraph, makes me suspect that his occasionally expressed wish for sending African Americans back to Africa may actually be better understood in terms of Lincoln believing resettlement an expedient path to colonizing Africa to extend the empire of republican government there. Lincoln increasingly appears to me to have viewed the Great Powers of Europe (monarchies and theocracies with their wealth deposited in a British central banking system) as the greatest threat to the American experiment in representative government. Colonizing Africa with representative governments would in conjunction with a New York to Moscow rail and telegraph empire of sorts have formed a belt of representative government around the entire planet.
In short, Abraham Lincoln was in position to quickly become the most powerful man on the planet with a continental center point in global grand strategy under his nearly unchallengeable control, two oceans at his disposal, control of perhaps two thirds of the globe's sea lanes and strong prospects for further expansion to Africa. What if it were imperative that such a man be assassinated and that the assassination be blamed on an elaborate, but set up band of Confederate conspirators set up to take the fall, so that the American nation (at least the winning Union portion of it) that had grown to trust Lincoln in war more than anyone else, did not EVER come to realize the almost unimaginable power that they--the duly constituted, sovereign American nation--at that moment, prior to the 1868 14th Amendment incorporation of USA, held in their then sovereign, voting hands. What if they could NEVER be allowed to know that a variety of domestic and foreign interests had interplayed in politics, banking, and great power relations, in pursuit to attain just such a phenomenal position of global geostrategic advantage and that an unintended consequence had delivered Abraham Lincoln, and the sovereign American nation of individuals with certain inalienable rights, to that pinnacle of power, instead of them?
Ever since the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, then it appears possible that America had been caught up in the midst of an unrelenting, private oligarchic free for all attempting to cartelize control of the North American geostrategic center point from which awesome global power over global trade could be exerted. It has resulted in the most extensive global financial hegemony over global trade in the history of the world and easily the greatest bloodbath of slaughter and conquest in any 170 year stretch of the history of the world. And what if the private oligarchs were not done struggling for control and empire yet?
This could explain the relentless thirst of American leadership for war for expansion of financial empire that persists to this day in a country that on paper at least constitutes itself as a republic based on principles of all men being created equal and sovereignty of the people, rather than sovereignty of the government. Most ordinary Americans believe in representative government with liberty and justice for all--not global financial hegemony for a 1 %, yet our government, especially the Deep State apparently embedded in it, largely appears to devote our government's resources to maintaining and expanding the global financial hegemony of the 1%.
Could it be?
Hmm.
Rock Chalk!